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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Battersby and Bailin’s paper provides an overview and a discussion of a range of 
fallacies, or reasoning errors (owed to various “biases”), identified in experimental 
cognitive psychology. The main claim, if I understand it correctly, is that this 
psychological research can be of pedagogical relevance to those who instruct 
students in critical thinking (CT). Specifically, this research may assist in developing 
strategies that allow avoiding the kinds of errors regularly reproduced in 
experimental settings both in the lab and outside (aka “reasoning in the wild”).  
Battersby and Bailin provide examples of fallacies/errors that are relatively 
new by the standards of “classical” critical thinking instruction (e.g., loss aversion, 
framing, anchoring, over-confidence). Moreover, they assert, cognitive psychology 
appears to explain—at least to some extent, and in some sense of ‘explain’—not only 
why such errors are reliably reproducible in experimental settings, but also why 
they are persuasive: “these errors are grounded in natural reasoning processes” (p. 
3). Their paper evidences a current trend which seeks to appropriate research 
results originating in a particular strand of cognitive psychology—the Heuristics and 
Biases program, significantly driven by the research of Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman—into argumentation studies and critical thinking instruction. 
This commentary will likewise stress both the importance of this research 
and its relevance for CT instructors and argumentation theorists. If an error in 
reasoning and argumentation can be assumed to be “owed to” a wide-spread and 
“natural” reasoning process (in the sense of “first nature”), then there is prima facie 
reason to believe that such errors can be avoided through some form of prescriptive 
intervention. And there is reason to believe that offering an explanation why these 
errors are persuasive might help students to “put the brakes on our tendency to 
rush to inference under certain circumstances” (p. 7). Yet, this is at best part of the 
full story. To speak meaningfully of biases, or errors, some normative standard must 
be assumed as correct. That assumption, as Sect. 2 argues, is not so innocent.  
Further, I have a mixed attitude about the current trend, which appears (to 
me) to run the risk of adopting a one-sided, and a somewhat “dumbed-down”—or 
popularized—version of the full breadth of the relevant psychological research. 
Empirical results and more conceptual considerations originating in the “ecological 
rationality”-research program (Gigerenzer & Sturm, 2012) cast doubt upon the 
validity status of some of the claims, assumptions, and methodologies endorsed on 
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the Kahneman-side of the Heuristics and Biases program (see particularly Samuels 
et al., 2002). Battersby and Bailin’s paper stays clear of increasing this risk but, as 
Sect. 3 argues, does not reduce it. 
Finally, it is less than perfectly clear which de-biasing strategies, or generally 
which forms of critical thinking pedagogy, are optimal or even sufficient in order to 
reliably overcome biases in the contexts in which they in fact result in errors. The 
thesis in Sect 4 is that our perhaps most ubiquitous form of instruction—informally 
known as the technique of “show and tell”—may not only fall short, but may even 
have adverse effects.  
 
1.1 Disclaimer 
 
To be clear, and because the below may be misinterpreted, I see no disagreement 
between Battersby and Bailin’s position and my own. The effects they cite have been 
well-established in experimental studies, and are by now widely known (though 
perhaps not within “classical” argumentation theory) (see, e.g., Politzer, 2004); I do 
not doubt that these results were obtained, I take issue with their interpretation. 
Further, the idea that such effects are ubiquitous since they result from natural 
reasoning processes—and so are persuasive because natural—appears to be entirely 
plausible; yet I doubt that this constitutes an informative explanation. Finally, I also 
agree that the challenge for instructors consists in “help[ing] students to see [a slow 
mode of] thinking critically as being worth the mental effort” (p. 8); yet I doubt that 
cognitive psychology currently has much to offer in terms of tested strategies that 
could assist CT instructors.  
I hope that the following will be understood not as an attempt to downplay 
the importance of Battersby and Bailin’s paper, but as an attempt to bring out the 
complexities often played-over when cognitive psychologists, and these days also 
argumentation scholars, engage with (the literature on) cognitive biases. 
 
2. NORMATIVE STANDARD 
 
It goes almost without saying that some normative standard of correctness is 
required to render the term ‘error’ meaningful. Take mathematical reasoning, for 
instance. By the standard of Peano arithmetic: “1 and 1 is 2”; by the standard of 
binary arithmetic: “1 and 1 is 0”; and by the standard which my nice endorsed 
around age five: “1 and 1 is 11.” So, to claim that human are systematically prone to 
err in reasoning (and in being persuaded by arguments grounded in such reasoning) 
must presuppose that exactly one standard is normatively correct in some context. 
By and large, the normative standard is that which subjects’ performance reliably 
deviates from when they solve experimental reasoning tasks of the kind typically put 
to them by experimental cognitive psychologists.  
As Cohen (1981) and several later authors (e.g., Evans 2008) have pointed 
out, for any reasoning task in experimental psychology, sound methodology 
presupposes the experimenter to have previously selected the correct normative 
standard. Moreover, the correct normative standard, S, chosen for such tasks tends 
to be co-extensive with that endorsed in recognized theories of decision making. 
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Normally part of our best current expert knowledge, then, S is embedded within a 
theoretical framework under idealization and simplification. Such theories, and the 
standards they recommend, we may say, are formulated against the backdrop of an 
idealized environment, or an idealized context.  
Natural environments or contexts, in contrast, are uncertain rather than 
risky. And they are populated by bounded agents, i.e., agents who lack full insight, 
information, time, etc. Bounded or not, moreover, agents may contingently not yet 
be acquainted with whichever normative standard experimenters call “confirmed” 
(or “instantiated”) when they observe subjects exhibiting the “rational response” to 
(or the “rational choice-behavior vis-à-vis”) a reasoning task, T.  
In fact, in some contexts similar but not identical to the lab setting, there can 
be good reasons to inhibit deploying standard S, although S remains the correct 
standard vis-à-vis T in context C. Much here depends on the phrase “in some 
contexts.” It is a placeholder for the conditions (some, but not others, of which are 
by now better known) under which our “natural reasoning and decision making-
inclination” (aka System 1 reasoning; see Evans 2008 for a critique of current 
assumptions), vis-à-vis task T, leads to a result, R*, that is at least as good—and 
sometimes, in a special sense, better—than R, where R is the results one would 
obtain by deploying the experimenter-chosen S outside the lab (see below).  
When much depends on such conditions, it is irresponsible to assume—and to 
teach to others—that psychological experiments demonstrate, come what may, that 
a majority of subjects err whenever they choose in ways that are not licensed by the 
normative standard selected as correct. Rather, whenever subjects do deploy an 
alternative standard—let’s assume that some standard is always deployed—, then 
they behave incorrectly in the experimental setting. But that says rather little!  
One would, or so I presume in the following, like it to come out as analytical 
that errors of reasoning are committed, if and only if deploying the reasoning 
standard S* vis-à-vis a reasoning task T in context C produces a result R* (aka a 
decision) that deviates significantly from a result R, where R—ultimately obtained 
via expert knowledge—is licensed by standard S as the correct result vis-à-vis T in C.  
 
3. ECOLOGICAL RATIONALITY 
 
The discussion on whether subjects do in fact understand the experimenter’s 
instructions exclusively concerns the correct identification of the task, T. Kahneman, 
for instance, does on occasion express slight bewilderment at subjects applying, say, 
a representative heuristics, although the task explicitly uses the term ‘probability’ 
(and avoids the term ‘representativeness’)—catchphrase: “they solve the easier 
task.” It stands to reason that such results too often fall back upon the experimenter 
(Cohen, 1981; Kuhn, 1962).  
This may for instance be the case with the infamous Linda problem (the 
presentation of which always comes backed up by reports that subjects agree with 
the normative standard selected as correct, once it has been explained to them). 
Strangely, however, subjects seem to become better—they appear more inclined to 
“avoid the error” (perhaps by inhibiting deployment of S*)—whenever a task 
apparently equivalent to the Linda problem is formulated in terms of frequency. 
FRANK ZENKER 
4 
Similar things hold for tasks that mirror the logical structure of Wason’s selection 
task, but employ a social setting (so called cheater detection task, see Cosmides, 
1989, Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). And similar things again hold for the Bayes rate 
fallacy (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996). So, such cases are not straightforwardly errors 
unless subjects in fact understand the task instructions in ways that make only T, 
but not T*, the identified reasoning task to be solved.  
It appears doubtful (to me) to assume that T—for which, recall, vis-à-vis 
context C deploying standard S is assumed to be correct—can be understood 
unequivocally by subjects, unless (the deployment of) standard S is in fact at their 
disposal. If so, then the deployment of the correct normative standard S to T vis-à-vis 
C presupposes the correct identification of T by subjects. If ought shall imply can, 
however, then any hypothesis on the frequency of subjects’ expected deployments 
of S (vis-à-vis T in C) that stipulates a non-zero frequency must likewise presuppose 
S to be deployable; so S must be accessible to subjects.  
Moreover, whenever deploying S* vis-à-vis T leads to a result R*, but if R* 
does not (significantly) deviate from R, then deploying S* should not count as an 
error either. At best, deploying S might here be a process-mistake. The important 
difference is simply that S* did not deliver an erroneous result.  
But when a choice between two different reasoning standards (which, 
respectively, adhere to standards S and S*) is neutral with respect to the result 
obtained—vis-à-vis T in C—, then it is prima facie plausible to assume that our best 
frequency measure of ‘deployments of normative standards (such as S or S* vis-à-vis 
T or T*) in a C context’ (i.e., in the lab) will register values not far from those for 
such deployments in non-C contexts, i.e., in “the wild”. One may now perhaps more 
readily appreciate the significance of the frequency distribution of T and T* tasks, 
and of the deployments of S and S* standards, in the wild.  By and large, in the wild it 
is difficult to find equivalent ones for the kinds of tasks put to subjects in the 
experimental context, C. Put differently, experimental tasks suffer from a lack of 
naturalness in most contexts but C.  
Given the above, the perhaps most important contribution for a pedagogy of 
critical thinking may be the insight that deploying S* may be rational when 
contextual constraints keep S from being applicable. In Battersby and Bailin’s paper, 
this insight can be discerned in the phrase “put the brakes on our tendency to rush 
to inferences under certain circumstances” (p. 7; italics added). Effectively, when S is 
not applicable, then task T cannot be meaningfully raised, making task T (what 
might be called) S-non-solvable in such contexts or environments. In such cases, the 
deployment of S* to T* (instead of S to T) is ecologically rational, and it is rational 
simpliciter when R* is at least as good a result as R, but when deploying S* is also 
less costly in terms of resources than deploying S. 
 As an immediate consequence, it would be misleading (to say the least) to 
teach “psychological insights into human biases” without stressing contextual 
constraints. Whenever some reasoning experiments demonstrate that, in context C, 
S* is predominantly applied vis-à-vis (instructions formulated to convey task) T, 
then one might ask how such results bear on non-T tasks in non-C contexts, 
especially on non-T tasks relevantly similar to T vis-à-vis non-C contexts relevantly 
similar to C.  
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 To apply the above to an example, consider anchoring. The term describes 
agents’ tendency, exposed in experiment, to be influenced by information most 
recently (and in some case initially) received, e.g., in the form of task instructions, 
although experimenters select this information so so that it is irrelevant for this task 
in this context. In such cases, the allegedly “rational” response amounts simply to 
discount the evidence, i.e., to choice-behave as if no evidence had been received (in 
our parlance: to inhibit the deployment of S*)—whatever this means.  
One can now inquire into the frequency of non-C contexts in which such 
discounting is ecologically rational. In a bar-context, for instance—where forms of 
“bullshitting,” or “pulling each other’s leg” are normal—, subject’s might frequently 
discount evidence. But what reason is there to suspect that, in the experimental 
context C, subjects will (with significant frequency) behave in ways one would far 
more readily expect in a bar context? There seem to be few grounds to expect as 
much. After all, in non-C contexts that bear out a greater similarity to the 
experimental than to the bar context, information received can normally be 
discounted only for good reasons. 
Each observed distribution of subjects’ choices (in response to T vis-à-vis C) 
remains of course informative, because it can always be compared to the entire 
range of possible distributions. But, although measuring the frequency of 
deployments of S* to T vis-á-vis C is thus informative, this also yields a measure of 
the dis-similarity of a C context (the experiment) from non-C contexts (such as the 
bar) in which S* is ecologically rational. So the explanation of subjects’ behavior 
would be that subjects did perceive C as being too similar to a context in which to 
deploy S* is an ecologically rational response.  
This, then, may finally serve to explain (to some extent) why certain “biases,” 
or “reasoning errors” are persuasive, i.e., have acquired a certain naturalness: they 
exhibit the ecological rationality of deploying S* to T* in non-C contexts. Note, 
however, that this explanation arises from comparing experimental and natural 
contexts. Moreover, the explanation depends on C being an ecologically rational 
choice in similar contexts, and emphatically not an error. It will, I suppose, be 
difficult to find this message stated very clearly in the work of those who have been 
inspired by Tversky, and perhaps more so Kahneman.  
Finally, it appears (to me) to be a rather non-informative explanation to 
stipulate that deploying S* is persuasive because it is natural to deploy S*. 
  
4. DE-BIASING STRATEGIES 
 
The implications of the foregoing for the development of de-biasing strategies and 
critical thinking pedagogy may now be discussed perhaps more briefly. When it 
depends on contextual information whether a reasoning error is what the term 
suggests—information which one must “factor into” a fallacy-judgment—, then we 
cannot hope to improve learners’ reasoning abilities, much less so in general (i.e., 
across all contexts), unless we can point out very specific reasons why it is S that 
should be deployed vis-à-vis T in C, but it is S* that should (or might as well) be 
deployed vis-à-vis T* in C*. Normally, what speaks for S vis-à-vis T in C (the lab) is 
that S is the only correct solution for T in C.  
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Leave the experimental setting, and things are immediately less clear. Unless 
we instill in our students the requisite sensitivity towards contextual constraints, 
we may expect that they will develop the same attitude towards biases as they 
normally develop towards fallacies. Their names are seemingly too frequently used 
for the sole purpose of “throwing” them in the face of adversaries in order to gain a 
perceived advantage in the kinds of contexts in which humans typically want to 
appear smart, to others and to themselves. 
To avoid misunderstanding, there are errors of reasoning in the sense that 
the following necessary conditions must obtain: (i) solving T requires deploying S in 
C; (ii) T is recognized by the agent, and (iii) S is at the subject’s disposal; (iv) S is not 
deployed, but S* is; (v) the result R* obtained by deploying S* deviates significantly 
from R. To teach anything less complex is, in my opinion, intellectually irresponsible. 
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